Touro Law Review
Volume 31

Number 4

Article 15

August 2015

Searching Inquiry Requirement in Civil Commitment Proceedings
of Sex Offenders
Arsalan Ali Memon

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Memon, Arsalan Ali (2015) "Searching Inquiry Requirement in Civil Commitment Proceedings of Sex
Offenders," Touro Law Review: Vol. 31: No. 4, Article 15.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/15

This Sixth Amendment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center.
For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Memon: Searching Inquiry Requirement

SEARCHING INQUIRY REQUIREMENT IN CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS OF SEX OFFENDERS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
In re New York v. Raul L.1
(decided June 4, 2014)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Respondent2 Raul L. represented himself in a civil commitment proceeding under the Sex Offenders Management and Treatment Act (“SOMTA”).3 The court found him to be a dangerous sex
offender requiring confinement4 and directed the respondent to a se1

988 N.Y.S.2d 190 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014).
Because the civil commitment proceedings are civil in nature, the parties subject to civil
commitment are designated as respondents. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(n)
(McKinney 2011). Defining respondent as:
[A] person referred to a case review team for evaluation, a person as to
whom a sex offender civil management petition has been recommended
by a case review team and not yet filed, or filed by the attorney general
and not dismissed, or sustained by procedures under this article.
Id. § 10.03(n)
3
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 193; see generally Sara E. Chase, Note, The Sex Offender
Management and Treatment Act: New York’s Attempt at Keeping Sex Offenders Off the
Streets . . . Will it Work?, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 277 (2009) (providing the reasons behind the
enactment of the Sex Offenders Management and Treatment Act and how the Act can be
improved).
4
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(b) (McKinney 2007). The statute explains who
requires confinement as a sex offender:
That some sex offenders have mental abnormalities that predispose them
to engage in repeated sex offenses. These offenders may require longterm specialized treatment modalities to address their risk to reoffend.
They should receive such treatment while they are incarcerated as a result of the criminal process, and should continue to receive treatment
when that incarceration comes to an end. In extreme cases, confinement
of the most dangerous offenders will need to be extended by civil process in order to provide them such treatment and to protect the public
from their recidivistic conduct.
2
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cure treatment facility.5 Respondent then appealed the trial court’s
decision.6 He argued that he was deprived of his statutory right to
counsel when the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry to
make certain “that he was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
proceeding pro se.”7 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the trial court’s decision in which
the court found the respondent to be a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement.8 The Appellate Division held that the lower court
erred in granting the respondent’s request to proceed pro se9 without
conducting a searching inquiry.10 Therefore, the court stated that the
respondent’s waiver of his statutory right to counsel was ineffective.11
This Case Note will discuss whether the court in Raul correctly applied the searching inquiry standard, which is conducted by the
courts in a criminal context, to a SOMTA proceeding pursuant to
Mental Hygiene Law Article 10.12 In doing so, this Note will analyze
the Appellate Division’s justifications for applying the searching inquiry standard to the SOMTA proceeding in Raul.13 Moreover, this
Note will suggest how the court could have reached a better decision
by appointing a standby counsel to be present during the SOMTA
proceeding.
Part II of this Note will describe the facts and procedural
background of Raul, and the Appellate Division’s stance on the issue
of the standard of waiver of the right to counsel in civil commitment
proceedings. Then Part III will discuss how the court analyzed the
issue in Raul. Part IV will address the federal approach to the issue
presented in Raul. In Part V, the approach taken by the State of New
Id. §10.01(b).
5
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 195; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(o) (McKinney 2011)
(defining secure treatment facility as “a facility located on the grounds of a correctional facility, that is staffed with personnel from the office of mental health or the office for people
with developmental disabilities for the purposes of providing care and treatment to persons
confined”).
6
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 200.
9
A person proceeding pro se “represents oneself in a court proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (8th ed. 2004).
10
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 192.
13
Id. at 197-99.
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Jersey on the issue will be presented. In Part VI, the holding in Raul
will be discussed. Finally, Part VII will provide recommendations on
how the court could have reached a better decision.
II.

IN RE NEW YORK V. RAUL L.
A.

Factual Background and Procedural History

In 2003, Raul L., at the age of 15, “entered a woman’s home,
struck her in the head with a baseball bat,” and sexually assaulted her
while she was unconscious.14 In 2005, a jury convicted him of sodomy in the first degree and assault in the first and second degree. He
was sentenced to prison.15
In March 2011, the State of New York commenced SOMTA
proceedings, (“trial”) pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law Article 10, to
determine whether probable cause existed to believe that the appellant was a sex offender requiring civil management.16 The respondent was detained at a secure treatment facility pending trial.17 Before
the trial, the respondent’s counsel recommended to the respondent
that the proceedings be adjourned.18 The respondent disagreed with
the recommendation.19 Prompted by this disagreement, the respondent’s counsel moved for leave to withdraw from the case.20 The trial
court denied counsel’s application and granted the adjournment of the
proceedings.21
During the trial, the court explained to the respondent that if
new counsel were appointed, the new counsel would require a few

14

Id.
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
16
Id.; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(q) (McKinney 2011) (defining a sex offender
requiring civil management as “a detained sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormality. A sex offender requiring civil management can, as determined by procedures set forth in
this article, be either (1) a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement or (2) a sex offender requiring strict and intensive supervision.”).
17
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 193 (noting that after the trial court concluded that probable
cause existed to believe that the respondent was a sex offender requiring civil management,
the trial court directed that the respondent be detained at a secure treatment facility).
18
Id. From the facts of the case it is not clear why the respondent’s counsel wanted the
proceedings to be adjourned.
19
Id. (noting that the respondent opposed his counsel’s recommendation on “an adjournment because he did not want to spend any additional time in the custody”).
20
Id.
21
Id.
15
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more months to prepare.22 The respondent then stated that he would
like to “fight” his own case and was willing to proceed pro se. 23 He
also informed the court about his familiarity with the Diagnostics and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (“DSM—IV”).24 The court
then relieved his counsel.25
The Assistant Attorney General, representing the State,
showed his concern about the trial court’s failure to conduct a broader inquiry concerning the respondent’s ability to represent himself
and handle the case.26 In response to his concern, the court stated that
it was only obligated to “put on the record” that the respondent was
aware “that he would represent himself” and did not need an attorney.27 Further, the court, referring to the letter written by the respondent regarding his disagreement, found that the letter demonstrated that the respondent knew how to read and write.28
B.

The Appellate Division’s Decision

On appeal, the Appellate Division had to decide whether the
respondent was deprived of his statutory right to counsel when the
trial court granted his request to proceed pro se without conducting a
searching inquiry.29 The court held that a trial court must conduct a
searching inquiry in SOMTA proceedings to determine whether a respondent intelligently and voluntarily waived his statutory right to
counsel.30 Therefore, the trial court’s error of granting the respond22

Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
Id.
24
Id.; see DSM, AMN. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm (last
visited Mar. 27, 2015) (explaining that the “Diagnostics and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) is the standard classification of mental disorders used by mental health
professionals in the United States”).
25
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 193-94. When the Assistant Attorney General insisted again that “a further inquiry was necessary, the court replied that it was satisfied that the appellant was aware of
what he was doing.”
28
Id.
29
Id. at 195. One of the issues on appeal was “that the State failed to establish, by clear
and convincing evidence that [the respondent] was a sex offender suffering from a mental
abnormality.” This Note, however, will not focus on that issue.
30
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 200 (noting that “a court must conduct a searching inquiry in
order to determine whether a respondent in a SOMTA intelligently and voluntarily waived
the statutory right to counsel is manifest, considering that such proceedings invariably require expert testimony and two separate hearings”).
23

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/15

4

Memon: Searching Inquiry Requirement

2015

SEARCHING INQUIRY REQUIREMENT

923

ent’s request to proceed pro se without conducting a searching inquiry deprived the respondent of his statutory right to counsel.31
III.

ANALYSIS

In order to decide the issue, the court in Raul had to determine
“whether the due process considerations that underpin a sex offender’s statutory right to counsel in a SOMTA proceeding obligate the
court to conduct the same type of searching inquiry that is required in
a criminal proceeding.”32 In reaching its decision, the court applied a
very systematic approach. The court first examined the kind of
searching inquiry conducted in criminal cases and then analyzed
whether SOMTA proceedings were criminal or civil in nature. After
concluding that SOMTA proceedings were civil in nature, the court
had to determine whether the due process concerns that are implicated in a criminal case require the same searching inquiry be conducted
in a SOMTA proceeding. To better understand how the court in Raul
reached its decision, this Case Note will discuss each question that
the court answered in reaching its decision.
A.

The Searching Inquiry in Criminal Cases

After the court in Raul ascertained that “the federal and state
constitutional right to counsel also includes” the right of selfrepresentation and the right to refuse appointed counsel,33 it looked at
various criminal cases to analyze what type of searching inquiry is
conducted in criminal cases and the scope of such inquiry.34
1.

People v. Smith

In 1998, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Smith35
reviewed whether the defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was
effective.36 The defendant in Smith was convicted of selling illegal
drugs.37 Numerous times, before and during the trial, the defendant
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 197-98.
705 N.E.2d 1205 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 1206.
Id.
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expressed his unhappiness with his assigned attorney and frequently
requested that the court assign new counsel.38 The defendant also
maintained that he could not proceed pro se.39 The court repeatedly
denied his request for new counsel.40 During the trial, the defendant’s counsel requested to be relieved because the defendant had
threatened him.41 The trial judge discussed this allegation with the
defendant.42 During the “waiver-textured colloquy,” the defendant
never asserted that he wanted to proceed pro se, but the judge relieved his counsel.43 For the rest of the trial, the defendant proceeded
pro se and was found guilty.44
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s deci45
sion. In its decision, the Appellate Division concluded that the de38

Id.
Id.
40
Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1206.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1206-07. Following is the discussion between the defendant and the judge:
THE COURT: I told you, Mr. Smith, that that's the only legal counsel you're
going to get. Now, you have no right—and I have no reason to disbelieve Mr.
Kury, as an officer of the Court, if he told me you said something. So it looks
like you don't want Mr. Kury. So I'm going to let you proceed without Mr.
Kury as your attorney. He will sit back there and if you want to ask him a
question, he will give you legal advice. If you think you know how to conduct a cross-examination, you can do it, but you're not going to abuse attorneys.
THE DEFENDANT: I'm not going to abuse attorneys, but it's all right for an
attorney to abuse me?
THE COURT: In what manner are you claiming that he abused you?
THE DEFENDANT: In what manner are you saying I abused him?
THE COURT: If he tells me that you threatened him, as an officer of the
Court, I believe him. Are you telling me that he threatened you?
THE DEFENDANT: No, but I didn't threaten him either. I just told the man
it's like there's two D.A.'s in here.
THE COURT: I'm sure Mr. Kury will accept your apology if you want him to
continue as your attorney.
THE DEFENDANT: No, there's two D.A.'s in here.
THE COURT: That's your opinion. I don't see two D.A.'s in here.
THE DEFENDANT: Not on paper, but other than that.
THE COURT: And you don't want him? You're discharging him?
THE DEFENDANT: Now you're discharging him, I'm not discharging him.
MR. KURY: Your Honor, I am—
THE COURT: I'm relieving him. He doesn't have to take this abuse, I'm relieving him.
Id. at 1207.
44
Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1207.
45
Id. at 1209.
39
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fendant was inadequately warned by the trial court about the risks of
proceeding pro se; therefore, his implied waiver of right to counsel
was ineffective.46 The Court of Appeals noted that “a trial court must
be satisfied that a defendant’s waiver is unequivocal, voluntary and
intelligent” even if the defendant insists on proceeding pro se and renounces the benefits that are associated with his right to counsel.47
Further, the court held that if the searching inquiry is not conducted,
then the waiver of the right to counsel will not be recognized as effective.
Moreover, the court stated that to recognize whether or not
such a requirement is appropriately satisfied, trial courts should conduct a searching inquiry into whether the defendant understands the
dangers and risks associated with waiving his right to counsel and
proceeding pro se.48 Furthermore, the trial courts are also required to
investigate other factors (e.g., age, education, and occupation) that
might bear on a defendant’s competency, intelligence, and voluntary
waiver.49 The court even noted that “a defendant’s refusal to cooperate with” his assigned counsel, or to acknowledge the assigned counsel, cannot be considered a waiver of his right to counsel.50
2.

People v. Arroyo

The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Arroyo51 addressed the issue of the inherent clash between a defendant’s right to
self-representation and his right to counsel.52 The defendant in Arroyo was convicted of robbery and grand larceny after a jury trial.53
During the trial, the defendant informed the trial court that he wanted

46

Id. at 1208-09 (noting that the record shows that the trial judge at several points during
his colloquy “made cautionary or encouraging statements to defendant about the fact that
defendant had a right to an attorney,” and the trial judge also ensured that the defendant
knew that he had an “excellent” assigned counsel. However, the trial judge failed to address
the “key admonition that is designed to pointedly alert a defendant of potential pro se representation pit falls and responsibilities.”).
47
Id. at 1207 (noting that “[g]overning principles demand that appropriate record exploration between the trial court and defendant be conducted, both to test an accused's understanding of the waiver and to provide a reliable basis for appellate review”).
48
Id.
49
Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208.
50
Id.
51
772 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 2002).
52
Id. at 1155.
53
Id.
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to proceed pro se and expressed his dissatisfaction with his assigned
counsel.54 The trial court made some “cursory warnings,” but the
court was mainly concerned with whether the defendant was of
“sound mind.”55 The trial court then granted the defendant’s request
to proceed pro se. However, the trial court requested the defense
counsel to be present as stand-by counsel.56
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision affirming the trial court’s decision, and held that the
defendant was not allowed to represent himself because “the trial
court failed to secure an effective waiver of counsel.”57 The court
noted that a defendant proceeding pro se must make a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and to evaluate whether the waiver meets the requirements, the court should conduct a searching inquiry of the defendant.58 Moreover, the court stated that even though the defendant does not need to possess the
experience and skills of an attorney, he should be told about the risks
and disadvantages associated with self-representation so that he is
aware of “what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”59
B.

Are SOMTA Proceedings Criminal in Nature?
1.

In Re New York v. Floyd Y.

The New York Court of Appeals in In Re New York v. Floyd
Y. had to decide whether the defendant’s due process rights were
violated when the trial court allowed “experts to introduce unreliable,
60

54

Id.
Id. Following is the discussion that was noted by the trial court:
[Y]ou have a right to do it because I don’t think there’s anything wrong
with you. A person has a right to represent himself, but it is usually not
a good idea. . . . I don’t have to ask you any questions to know that you
are sensible to some extent and have a right to represent yourself. I have
to make sure that you're of sound mind and the rest of it and I’m convinced of that. But I would like to talk you out of it because [defense
counsel is] going to make a better summation.
Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1155.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1156.
58
Id. at 1155.
59
Id. at 1156 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1974)).
60
2 N.E.3d 204 (N.Y. 2013).
55
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testimonial hearsay.”61 The Appellate Division held that the trial
court did err in allowing the expert’s opinions because they were
based on unreliable accusations against the defendant, but the Appellate Division did find this error to be harmless, which prompted the
appeal to the Court of Appeals.62 The New York Court of Appeals,
in reversing the decision of the Appellate Division, held that “[t]he
admission of the unreliable hearsay was not harmless error” because
two of the allegations in the opinion testimony violated the defendant’s due process right.63 In order to determine whether the right to
due process exists in a SOMTA proceeding, the court analyzed
whether SOMTA proceedings were civil in nature rather than criminal.
The court noted that “[w]hen a sex offender commitment statute is punitive in nature, the respondent enjoys the same due process
rights as a criminal defendant.”64 However, the civil commitment
proceeding is not criminal in nature “when the State acts through its
parens patriae power to confine a sex offender for therapy and treatment . . . .”65 Further, by interpreting the language in the statute the
court found that SOMTA “falls squarely within the substantive due
process requirements for civil process.” 66 Moreover, the court
looked at other New York cases and recognized that SOMTA has a
remedial purpose rather than a penal one.67 Therefore, the court
found that the constitutional protection of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments do not apply in SOMTA proceedings, but due process
rights still exist through the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.68
2.

In Re New York v. Campany

In In Re New York v. Campany,69 the issue was whether, in a
criminal action, the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel
61

Id. at 209.
Id. at 208.
63
Id. at 214-15.
64
Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d at 209.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 210.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 209 (noting that the scope of procedural due process is governed by the balancing
test as expressed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
69
905 N.Y.S.2d 419 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2010).
62

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 4 [2015], Art. 15

928

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 31

should be applied to SOMTA proceedings.70 The Appellate Division,
Fourth department analyzed whether SOMTA proceedings are criminal or civil in nature, and the court held that the proceedings are of a
civil nature.71 The court in Campany reasoned that even though the
jury trial pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 has some characteristics of a criminal trial (e.g., the jury consists of 12 jurors and a
unanimous verdict must be rendered), the legislative intent, plain language of the statute, and purpose of the statute make it civil, rather
than criminal, in nature. 72
C.

Statutory Right to Counsel in SOMTA Proceedings

Under SOMTA, a respondent has a statutory right to counsel
when the court shall appoint the counsel for a respondent if the respondent is financially unable to obtain counsel himself.73 The court
in Raul examined a variety of family court proceedings in which,
even though no Sixth Amendment right of counsel was involved, the
court applied the same principles that are applied in criminal cases to
safeguard the right to counsel.74
In Matter of Kathleen K. (Steven K.),75 where the family court
refused to allow the respondent’s father to proceed pro se in a proceeding to terminate his parental rights, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
70

Id. at 422.
Id. at 423-25.
72
Id. at 425.
73
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(c)-(d) (McKinney 2012). Stating when the court
shall appoint an attorney for the respondent:
(c) Promptly upon the filing of a sex offender civil management petition,
or upon a request to the court by the attorney general for an order pursuant to subdivision (d) of this section that a respondent submit to an evaluation by a psychiatric examiner, whichever occurs earlier, the court
shall appoint counsel in any case where the respondent is financially unable to obtain counsel.
(d) [T]he attorney general may request the court in which the sex offender civil management petition could be filed, or is pending, to order the
respondent to submit to an evaluation by a psychiatric examiner. Upon
such a request, the court shall order that the respondent submit to an
evaluation by a psychiatric examiner chosen by the attorney general and,
if the respondent is not represented by counsel, the court shall appoint
counsel for the respondent.
Id.
74
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
75
953 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 2011).
71
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Division, Second Department, because the record did not demonstrate
that the respondent’s application for self-representation was unequivocal and timely.76 The court noted that such proceeding has a “Faretta-type right of self-representation.”77 Further, the court mentioned
that if the request to proceed pro se had been timely, then a searching
inquiry would have been triggered to ensure that the respondent’s
waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.78
Although family court proceedings are civil in nature, they
implicate constitutional due process concerns because these proceedings “involve issues of fundamental import relating to the welfare and
custody of children.”79 Furthermore, these proceedings can also “result in adjudication that can bear an everlasting and significant stigma.”80
D.

SOMTA Proceedings and Due Process Implications

Although SOMTA proceedings are civil in nature and no constitutional protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply, the
respondent has a constitutional right to due process.81 Even though in
a family court proceeding the rights at stake are significant, the court
in Raul stated that the rights at risk in SOMTA proceedings are no
less important than those in a family court proceeding.82 The court,
in differentiating criminal trials from SOMTA proceedings, stated
that the implications for one’s due process rights in SOMTA proceedings are greater than those for the due process rights involved in a
criminal trial because in a criminal trial, an individual has a definite
sentence, while in SOMTA proceedings an individual can be indefinitely and involuntarily detained for his lifetime.83 The threat to the
76

Id. at 776-78.
Id. at 777. For a discussion of Faretta v. California, see infra Part IV.
78
Id.
79
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 200 (noting that “at the heart of the due process guarantees in the federal and state
constitutions is the principle that when the State seeks to take life, liberty, or property from
an individual, the State must provide effective procedures that guard against an erroneous
deprivation”).
82
Id. at 199.
83
Id. at 199; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §10.09(h) (McKinney 2012) (noting that
“[a]t the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is currently a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, the
77
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liberty of a respondent is more severe.84 Therefore, the court in Raul
reasoned that the standard for the waiver of the right to counsel in
criminal proceedings is in every respect proper in SOMTA proceedings because of the due process implications.85
IV.

FEDERAL APPROACH

To better evaluate whether the court in Raul applied the correct standard, it is necessary to have an understanding of the federal
approach to this issue. In criminal cases, the defendant has a right to
counsel.86 That right to counsel has been applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.87 In
Faretta v. California,88 the court held that in criminal cases the defendant has a constitutional right, under the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, to waive his or her constitutional right to
counsel.89 Therefore, the court must inform the defendant of the disadvantages of self-representation and that he will be held to the same
standard as others for knowing the rules and procedures of the
court.90 If an accused proceeds pro se, he relinquishes many of the
established benefits related with the right to counsel; therefore, in order to proceed pro se, the respondent must knowingly and intelligently relinquish those benefits.91 The accused should be told about the
dangers and disadvantages associated with self-representation to escourt shall continue the respondent's confinement.”).
84
Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (providing that the “a respondent in a SOMTA proceeding
arguably faces an even more severe threat to his or her liberty than that faced by a criminal
defendant”).
85
Id. at 199-200.
86
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. (emphasis added).
87
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
providing that the accused shall enjoy the right to counsel in criminal cases applies to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment of the constitution).
88
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
89
Id. at 836.
90
Id. at 835.
91
Id.
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tablish that he makes his choice to self-represent knowingly and intelligently.92 The defendant in a criminal case is not required to have
the experience and skills of a lawyer in order to self- represent.93
This searching inquiry is to be conducted by the court before the defendant can waive his right to counsel in a criminal proceeding because in such a proceeding the defendant’s right to life, liberty, or
property is at stake.
In July 2006, Congress enacted the Civil Commitment of a
Sexually Dangerous Person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act.94 Although Congress has provided the right to counsel in such civil commitment proceedings,95 the courts have also held
that because the outcome of such proceedings can be negative, which
can result in a “massive curtailment of liberty,” procedural due process guarantees certain protections in civil commitment proceedings
to respondents.96 Therefore, the analysis of the court in Raul was
correct. If the court can provide right to counsel because the due process concerns in civil commitment proceedings are the same as those
in criminal proceedings, then the court should also apply the same
standard for the waiver of the right to counsel in civil commitment
proceedings that is applied in criminal trials because of the due process implications.
Furthermore, because the individuals’ rights at risk can implicate due process concerns, the courts in civil cases have also conducted inquiries into whether or not individuals are knowingly and
voluntarily relieving their right to counsel. Similarly, the court in
92

Id.
Farretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
94
18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006).
95
Certain protections, by statute, have been provided by Congress. See 18 U.S.C.
§4247(d) (2006) (providing the defendant with representation by counsel, and “an opportunity to testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses . . . , and to confront and crossexamine witnesses who appear at the hearing”).
96
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-93 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,
509 (1972)); see also United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 842-43 (4th Cir. 1995), which
states:
[T]he constitutional rights to which a defendant in a criminal trial is entitled do not adhere to a respondent in a commitment hearing. Nonetheless, because an adverse result in a commitment hearing results in a substantial curtailing of the respondent’s liberty (whether the respondent is
already a prisoner or not), . . . the Supreme Court has held that procedural due process does guarantee certain protections to civil commitment respondents.
Id.
93
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Raul correctly held that the searching inquiry standard is the standard
for the waiver of the right to counsel because the respondents in civil
commitment trials have a lot at stake.
V.

SIMILARITY BETWEEN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS

When determining whether a respondent suffers from mental
abnormality, New York’s civil commitment statute requires clear and
convincing evidence,97 which is in accordance with the standard of
proof established by the Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas.98
However, many scholars have argued that the standard of proof
should be beyond a reasonable doubt because of the difficulties that
arise in civil commitment proceedings and procedural fairness.99 But
many states have kept the clear and convincing standard as the standard of proof for civil commitment proceedings.100
The goals of criminal proceedings are the same as the goals of
civil commitment for sex offenders because in both the state wants to
protect its citizens from harm that can be caused by dangerous criminals. As the goals of criminal proceedings and civil commitments for
sex offenders are the same, so are the liberty interests that are at

97
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §10.07(d) (McKinney 2007) (noting that the court “shall
determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the respondent is a detained sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormality.”).
98
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979) (establishing the clear and convincing standard as the minimum standard of proof required in order to perform a civil
commitment).
99
See Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE. L. REV.
253, 257 (2011). Stating that:
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is better suited to civil commitment hearings because it is more exacting and less likely to lead to
the erroneous deprivation of liberty. Two difficulties arise in civil commitment. The first of these involves repeated empirical findings that
show psychiatrists are no better at predicting dangerous behaviors than
untrained people. The second problem judges face in applying the Supreme Court standard in Comstock is the ambiguity of the very concept
of mental illness.
Id.
100
Id. at 275-77 (describing the statutory scheme of many states on the burden of proof
requirement in civil commitment cases after Addington v. Texas and stating that “[t]he overwhelming majority of states do not use the highest standard of proof for involuntary institutionalization hearings. They instead rely on the Supreme Court’s holding in Addington,
which only requires clear and convincing proof.”).
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stake.101 An alleged criminal who is not properly defended may end
up spending more time in jail than he should. Similarly, an alleged
sex offender might be wrongfully civilly committed. Because an individual may be deprived of a liberty interest, due process concerns
arise in civil commitment proceedings.102 To prevent the wrongful
deprivation of liberty, due process requires a “rigorous standard of
proof.”103 Similarly, if a court allows a respondent to proceed pro se
without conducting a searching inquiry, the liberty interests of such a
respondent are at stake and could result in severe deprivation of liberty if that respondent is found guilty. Thus, to protect the liberty interest of respondents, the courts should apply the searching inquiry.
VI.

IN RE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF D.Y.

Because of the recent enactment of the civil commitment statutes for sex offenders,104 the courts are still developing the governing
body of law. Other than New York, only a few states have provided
guidance on whether the searching inquiry should be conducted in a
civil commitment proceeding for sex offenders. Some states have
chosen not to rule on the issue of whether the respondent has a right
to counsel in a civil commitment proceeding.105 But others have
adopted the searching inquiry with certain limitations or requirements
attached to the right of self-representation.
Only a month after Raul, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
In re Civil Commitment of D.Y.106 reversed the decision of the Appellate Division, which held that a respondent in a Sexually Violent

101

See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a) (McKinney 2007) (explaining that
“[c]ivil and criminal processes have distinct but overlapping goals, and both should be part
of an integrated approach . . . .”).
102
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (stating that “civil commitment for
any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection”).
103
Tsesis, supra note 99, at 260. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976) (stating how due process obligates courts to determine the risks that state action will
result in an erroneous deprivation of one’s rights).
104
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §304-27.1 (West 2009); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a)
(McKinney 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.09.030 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§980.015 (West 2008).
105
See Favors v. Jesson, No. A13-1579, 2014 WL 997055, at*4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 17,
2014) (refusing to give any proper ruling on whether the respondent had a right to selfrepresent himself in a criminal trial because the respondent failed to cite any authority).
106
95 A.3d 157 (N.J. 2014).
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Predator Act (“SVPA”)107 civil commitment proceeding does not
have the right to self-representation.108 The New Jersey Supreme
Court found that a sex offender who is competent to stand trial has a
constitutional right to self-representation with standby counsel.109
The issue was whether the respondent had a right to proceed pro se in
an involuntary civil commitment proceeding pursuant to the
SVPA.110
The respondent in D.Y. was convicted of various sex offenses,
both in state and federal court; in October 1994, he pled guilty to two
counts of the federal indictment, and in April 1995, he was sentenced
to 137 months incarceration.111 When the respondent was near completion of his term of incarceration, which was on or about June 7,
2008, the State petitioned for the respondent’s involuntary civil
commitment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28.112 At the final civil
commitment hearing, which D.Y. did not attend, the assigned counsel
advised the court that the respondent had refused to talk to him and
that the respondent wished to proceed pro se.113 The trial court only
allowed the respondent to “participate in his representation in conjunction with” his counsel.114
First, the court found the genesis of the right to selfrepresentation in the English common law and English legal tradition.115 Second, because a respondent’s decision to proceed pro se
may weaken his position in the case, and can also hinder the proceedings, the need for standby counsel exists in cases where the litigants
want to proceed pro se.116 Then the court referred to criminal proceedings in which the defendants exercised their right to proceed pro
se and the presence of standby counsel was a successful solution to

107

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.24 (West 1999).
D.Y., 95 A.3d at 160.
109
Id. at 171.
110
Id. at 160.
111
Id. at 161-62.
112
Id. at 162; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.28(c) (West 1999) (stating that “[t]he Attorney General may initiate a court proceeding for involuntary commitment . . . of an inmate
who is scheduled for release upon expiration of a maximum term of incarceration . . . .”).
113
D.Y., 95 A.3d at 163.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 165; see also Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 557 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that
“[t]he origins of the right to appear for oneself in civil proceedings derive from a number of
sources, all deeply rooted in our history and culture”).
116
D.Y., 95 A.3d at 167.
108
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the challenges that might be caused during the trial.117 The standby
counsel helps not only the respondent, but also the court by protecting the integrity of the civil commitment proceeding when a respondent is uncooperative with the court.118
Finally, the court in D.Y., analyzed the plain language of
SVPA and held that it “requires that there be one of two alternative
forms of representation at SVPA commitment hearings: (1) full representation of the [respondent] by counsel or (2) self-representation”
with standby counsel present throughout the proceedings and available to assist the respondent if needed.119 Further, the court held that
the decision to waive the right to full representation by counsel
should be unequivocally and clearly stated to the trial court.120
Moreover, the trial court should ensure the waiver is made by the respondent knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.121 The court resolved the issue in D.Y. by statutory construction and did not reach
the Sixth Amendment and due process issues.122
VII.

DISCUSSION OF RAUL IN CONTEXT OF CASES DISCUSSED

The court in Raul applied a very systematic approach in
reaching its decision. First, it inquired about what kind of searching
inquiry is conducted in criminal cases. For that reason, it analyzed
different criminal cases. It determined that for a waiver of the right
to counsel to be effective, the courts in criminal cases must make sure
that the defendant had been adequately warned about the risks and
disadvantages of proceeding pro se and about the benefits of the right
to counsel. The courts in criminal cases must consider whether the
defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right
to counsel.
After the court in Raul analyzed and discussed the scope of
the searching inquiry in order to waive the right to counsel in crimi117

Id.
Id. at 168 (stating that having a standby counsel “also serves to protect the integrity of
the proceeding when a litigant is uncooperative with the court and to the opposing counsel,
or refuses to proceed at all”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (finding that “the trial
judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious
and obstructionist misconduct”).
119
D.Y., 95 A.3d at 171.
120
Id. at 172.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 161.
118
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nal cases, it inquired as to whether SOMTA proceedings are criminal
in nature. If SOMTA proceedings were criminal in nature, then applying the same inquiry as in criminal cases would be justified.
However, in Raul, the court was not able to find any relevant authority. The courts in New York have held that SOMTA proceedings are
civil in nature rather than criminal because New York’s civil commitment statute is not punitive. As a result, a respondent in a
SOMTA proceeding does not enjoy the same due process rights that a
defendant in a criminal proceeding does. Therefore, the court in Raul
noted that the Sixth Amendment protections do not apply to SOMTA
proceedings.123
The defendant in SOMTA proceedings does not enjoy the
same due process rights as does a defendant in a criminal case because SOMTA proceedings are civil in nature.124 However, the court
in Raul found that in family court proceedings, which are civil in nature, the searching inquiry has been applied.125 Because of the due
process implications in family court proceedings, the courts have applied the searching inquiry for the waiver of the right to counsel.126
Finally, in Raul, the court considered that the due process implications in SOMTA proceedings are similar to those in family court
proceedings because of the rights that are at stake.127 Therefore, the
court correctly applied the searching inquiry standard that is applied
in criminal cases.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
After evaluating the stances taken on the federal level and by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey on whether the searching inquiry
should be applied in a civil commitment proceeding, it can be concluded that the court in Raul correctly applied the searching inquiry
standard. The due process implications for the respondents involved
in SOMTA proceedings are the same, if not more significant, as for
those involved in criminal proceedings. However, if the court in
Raul had required a standby counsel to be present at all times, that
could have solved other challenges that might have arisen during the
123
124
125
126
127

Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 199.
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course of trial.128 Sometimes trial proceedings are disruptive because
the respondent does not want to cooperate or wants to delay the proceedings, or it might be that the respondent is not competent to handle his own case. Having a standby counsel is an effective solution
for all these challenges faced by the court during the course of trial.
In many criminal cases where the court does provide the right
to self-representation, the court appoints a standby counsel,129 even
though they are not required to do so.130 In D.Y., the reason the court
appointed standby counsel to be present during the entire proceeding
was because the New Jersey statute required it.131 In contrast, New
York’s civil commitment statute requires that counsel be appointed if
the respondent is financially unable to obtain one.132 The courts in
New York should follow New Jersey’s example and also require that
standby counsel be present during the course of the civil commitment

128

Because the topic of discussion of this Note is not whether the standby counsel should
be present in civil commitment proceeding, this Note only provides a cursory view of the
author’s opinion on why the court should have required standby counsel to be present during
the civil commitment proceedings.
129
See Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1207 (noting that “[d]efendant completed the trial pro se,
with the former counsel serving as legal advisor”).
130
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (finding that “a State may—even over objection by the
accused—appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to aid the accused if and when the accused requests
help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary”) (emphasis added).
131
Compare N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(b) (McKinney 2007) (stating the legislative
finds as: “[t]hat some sex offenders have mental abnormalities that predispose them to engage in repeated sex offenses. These offenders may require long-term specialized treatment
modalities to address their risk to reoffend. . . . [C]onfinement of the most dangerous offenders will need to be extended by civil process.”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.25(b)
(West 2008). The New Jersey statute states:
Under the existing involuntary commitment procedure, persons are subject to commitment if they are mentally ill and dangerous to self, others
or property. “Mental illness” is a current, substantial disturbance of
thought, mood, perception or orientation which significantly impairs
judgment, capacity to control behavior or capacity to recognize reality,
which causes the person to be dangerous to self, others or property. The
nature of the mental condition from which a sexually violent predator
may suffer may not always lend itself to characterization under the existing statutory standard, although civil commitment may nonetheless be
warranted due to the danger the person may pose to others as a result of
the mental condition.
Id.
132
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(c) (McKinney 2012) (stating that the court shall
appoint an attorney for the respondent “where the respondent is financially unable to obtain
counsel”).
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proceeding because of the dangers involved.133
IX.

CONCLUSION

The court in Raul correctly articulated the searching inquiry
standard that the trial court should conduct before granting a respondent’s request to proceed pro se. In civil cases the defendant
does not have a right to counsel through the Sixth Amendment, but
some states have provided right to counsel because of the due process
implications involved in certain type of civil cases. Similarly, the
searching inquiry should be conducted in civil commitment cases because of the due process implications involved. One of the reasons
for the courts to apply the same search inquiry standard as in criminal
cases is that the stakes of deprivation of liberty are high, and the respondents, by waiving their right, might end up being deprived of
their life, liberty, or property.
Further, even though New York’s civil commitment statute
does not require the counsel to be present as New Jersey’s civil
commitment statute does, the courts should require standby counsel
to be present during the course of civil commitment proceedings
when the respondent wants to proceed pro se. A standby counsel can
be an effective solution to challenges that might erupt during the
course of trial that cannot be handled by the respondent.
Arsalan Ali Memon*

133

The New York legislature, at the time of enacting the civil commitment statute, did not
take into consideration the importance of having standby counsel present during the proceedings. See generally Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act, N.Y. Bill Jacket, L.
2007, ch. 7 (providing no discussion in regards to providing standby counsel during SOMTA
proceedings). See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06 (providing no provision for standby
counsel to be present during SOMTA proceedings).
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